Oldal kiválasztása


Ebben az évben elnökválasztás lesz az USA-ban, ezért megosztok veletek néhány videót és cikket a BBC-től a témával kapcsolatban. Ezek elsősorban a Kínával való viszonyra koncentrálnak, ami sarokköve a választásoknak. Készítettem feladatokat is ill. a nehezebb szavakat kigyűjtöttem magyarul is.



What has we chat evolved into?

What makes th ebig difference between this and TikTok?

What is the threat posed by Wechat according to the security experts?

What topics are sensored by it?



What does Mr Trump want to do and against who is this step going to be taken?

How is it affecting KFC?

What other companies may be affected?

What is the desired effect of this measure?


ploy trükk, húzás

swathe rend, marok

tie up: társulás


The Trump Administration ramped up (felturbóz)its confrontation with Beijing this week, ordering the Chinese consulate in Houston to close over concerns about economic espionage.(kémkedés)

It’s the latest step in a downward spiral in relations between the dueling (párbajozó) economic powers which have sunk to the lowest level in decades.

The BBC’s Barbara Plett Usher takes a look at the motivations – and potential consequences – of this US-China face-off.(szembenállás)

How significant is this escalation?

It is not unprecedented for the US to close a foreign mission but it is a rare and dramatic step, one that is difficult to unwind.(visszacsinálni) This is a consulate not an embassy, so it’s not responsible for policy. But it plays an important role in facilitating trade and outreach.

And the move triggered retaliation (megtorlás) from Beijing: it ordered the US to close its consulate in the western Chinese city of Chengdu, dealing a further blow to (további csapást mér) the diplomatic infrastructure that channels communication between the two countries.

It’s probably the most significant development yet in the deterioration of relations over the past months, which have included visa restrictions, new rules on diplomatic travel, and the expulsion of foreign correspondents (külföldi tudósítók kiűzése). Both sides have imposed tit-for-tat (szemet szemért…)measures, but it is the United States that has largely been driving this latest cycle of confrontation.

How did we get here?

Senior administration officials have described the Houston consulate as „one of the worst offenders” in economic espionage and influence operations that they say are occurring at all the Chinese diplomatic facilities.

A certain amount of spy-craft (kémtrükk, kémkedés) by foreign missions is expected but the officials said activity in Texas went well over acceptable lines and they wanted to send a strong message that it would not be tolerated.

The decision to take more „decisive action” to counter China and „disrupt” its operations coincides (egybeesik) with a speech earlier this month by the FBI Director Christopher Wray. He said the Chinese threat to US interests had massively accelerated in the past decade, noting that he opened a new China-related counterintelligence investigation every 10 hours.

Beijing has routinely denied these charges and in the case of Houston, called them „malicious slander”. (rosszindulatú rágalom)

So is this move to confrontation about the election?

Yes and no.

„Yes” because Mr Trump has only recently fully adopted the anti-China campaign-speach that his strategists feel will resonate with voters. It builds on his 2016 nationalist talking points about getting tough (bekeményít)with a China that had „ripped off (lehúz megrabol)the United States”.

But it adds a heavy dose of blame over the way Beijing handled the coronavirus outbreak as the president’s ratings on his own response tumble. The message is that China is responsible for the Covid mess in the country, not him.

„No” because hardliners in his administration, like Mr Pompeo, have for some time been pressing for tougher action against Beijing and laying the groundwork (megalapoz, alapot ás) for such an approach. The president had been vacillating between that advice and his own desire to pursue a trade deal and develop his „friendship” with the Chinese Leader Xi Jinping.

The consulate closure indicates that the China hawks have gained the upper hand (előnyhöz jut, felülkerekedik) for now, aided by genuine anger in Washington at the Chinese government’s lack of transparency about a virus that has brought global disaster.

What does this say about the state of US-China relations?

They’re pretty bad – at their lowest point since President Richard Nixon moved to normalise relations with the communist country in 1972. And both are to blame.

This has been building since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013 with a much more assertive and authoritarian playbook than his predecessors. China has added to the recent run-up in tensions with its harsh (kemény) national security law in Hong Kong and its repression of Muslim minority Uighurs, which triggered (kiváltott) several rounds of US sanctions.

But its clash (összetűzés) with the Trump administration’s America First nationalism is increasingly shaped by an ideological worldview that infused a speech about China delivered by Mr Pompeo this week. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War, he accused Chinese leaders of being tyrants on a quest for global domination (világuralom keresése), and framed America’s competition with Beijing as an existential struggle between freedom and oppression.

Many in Chinese government circles believe that the administration’s goal is to stop the country from catching up to America’s economic might (felzárkozni az amerikai gazdasági hatalomhoz), and are particularly angry at its moves to cut off access to Chinese telecommunications technology. But there is concern and confusion about the dizzying ramp-up of punitive measures (szédületes felgyorsulása a büntető intézkedéseknek). The foreign minister Wang Yi recently pleaded with the US to step back and seek areas where the two nations could work together.

Where is this heading?

In the short term expect a precarious (bizonytalan, ingatag) state of tension up to the election. The Chinese do not appear to be looking for escalation, and analysts agree that President Trump does not want a serious confrontation, certainly not a military one.

But Mr Russel, who’s currently a vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, warns about unintended conflict. „The buffer (ütköző)that has historically insulated (elszigetel, elválaszt) the US-China relationship, the presumption that the goal is to de-escalate and solve problems… has been stripped away,” he says.

The long term depends on who wins in November. But even though the Democratic candidate Joe Biden would be more inclined to revive avenues of cooperation, he’s also campaigning on a get-tough-with-China message. It’s a popular theme reflecting an extremely rare bipartisan consensus that goes beyond the occupant of the White House.

Jim Carafano, a national security expert at the conservative think tank, The Heritage Foundation, argues that challenging China’s „destabilising” behaviour is a path to stability, not escalation. „In the past we haven’t made clear where the Chinese were violating our interests and they’ve marched on,” he told the BBC.

But William Cohen, a Republican politician who served as defence secretary under the Democratic President Bill Clinton, thinks it’s dangerous that China is being seen as an adversary across the political spectrum.

Its military, economic and technological expansions have caused the US to say „we can’t do business the way we’ve been doing business,” he says.

„But we still have to do business.”


Trump or Biden? China expects no favours either way

The Democratic and Republican National Conventions are typically an opportunity for US voters to get a sense of what their next president’s domestic policies might look like.

But this year they also provided a key insight for China Inc as it navigates its rocky relationship with the US.

Several insiders at Chinese technology firms say that a Joe Biden presidency would be more appealing than another four more years of President Trump – which would be seen as „unpredictable”.

And while they think a Biden administration would still be tough on China, it would be based more on reason, and fact rather than rhetoric and politicking.

One thing is clear though: companies on the mainland believe that whoever is in the White House the tough stance on China is here to stay.

Here are three things that are worrying Chinese companies the most about the next US administration – and what they’re doing to protect themselves:

1, In what way is the Democratic and Republican Convention is different this year?

2, How would Chinese-Americans change if Biden was elected?


This word gets used a lot these days. President Trump and his administration talk about it in tweets and in press statements in relation to China.

Decoupling basically means undoing more than three decades’ worth of US business relations with China.

Everything is on the cards: from getting American factories to pull their supply chains out of the mainland, to forcing Chinese-owned companies that operate in the US – like TikTok and Tencent – to swap their Chinese owners for American ones

Make no mistake, under a Trump administration „decoupling will be accelerated”, according to Solomon Yue, vice chairman and chief executive of the Republicans Overseas lobby group.

„The reason is because there’s a genuine national security concern about our technology being stolen,” he said.

But decoupling isn’t that simple.

While the US has had some success in forcing American companies to stop doing business with Chinese tech giants like Huawei, it is pushing Chinese firms to develop self-sufficiency in some key industries, like chip-making and artificial intelligence.

„There’s a realisation that you can never really trust the US again,” a strategist working for a Chinese tech firm told me. „That’s got Chinese companies thinking what they need to do to protect their interests.”

3, What is decoupling in this context?

4, What are its implications?

5, What is its echo among Chinese companies?


As part of its focus on China, the Trump administration has come up with a set of recommendations for Chinese firms listed in the US, setting a January 2022 deadline to comply with new rules on auditing.

If they don’t, according to the recommendations, they risk being banned.

While a Biden administration may not necessarily push through with the exact same ban, analysts say the scrutiny and tone of these recommendations is likely to stay.

„A Democrat, whether in the White House, Senate or Congress, would have little reason to roll back Trump’s toughness on China without some concession in return,” said Tariq Dennison, a Hong Kong-based investment adviser at GFM Asset Management.

‘”One thing both parties seem to agree on in 2020 is to blame China for any of America’s problems that can’t be easily blamed on the other party. That’s not going to change anytime soon.”

While fears of being delisted aren’t high on the list of concerns for Chinese companies that are already listed in the US, it’s enough to sway the decisions of companies that are looking to float in the future.

Take Ant Group, for example, the mammoth Chinese digital financial services group that this week filed for an IPO.

Affiliated to the Alibaba Group, which is listed in the US and Hong Kong, it chose Hong Kong and Shanghai in which to sell its shares instead of the US.

Increasingly other Chinese companies are likely to follow suit, as tensions between the US and China get worse.

6, How is the Trump administration trying to further complicate the life of Chinese companies?

7, How does the two parties stance on China coincide?

8, How does this step influence the decisions of Chinese companies?


China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalisation over the last 30 years. It has helped hundreds of millions of Chinese afford a better quality and standard of life, the bedrock upon which President Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream is based.

But that’s precisely what President Trump says needs to change: his administration argues that China has become richer while the US has become poorer.

During Mr Trump’s term, deglobalisation – where borders are less open and trade is less free – has become a trend. And it’s something that Beijing knows won’t change even after the election.

„The fundamental adjustment of the US’ strategic mind-set over China is real”, reads the latest op-ed in the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, The Global Times. ‘This has to a large extent reset the China-US relationship.”

One of the natural consequences of globalisation was arguably a safer world.

If you’re doing business with one another, chances are you’re not going to want to get in a fight – or at least not open conflict.

A big worry for many businesses in Asia is that a real military clash between the two superpowers is inevitable – and those concerns only grew this week when Beijing fired missiles into the South China Sea, a lucrative but contested waterway.

The reset of the US-China relationship is dangerous – not just for the US and China – but for the rest of us too.

9, How did China benefit from globalisation?

10, What is the advantage of a globalised word?

11, Why is this trade war dangerous to the rest of the world?

1, They will deal more with China

2, It wouldn’t change considerably, the new president would still get tough on them.

3, Disentangling the business relationships between the two countries

4, American companies will have less Chinese suppliers, Chinese companies will have American owners

5, They have lost trust int he US and are trying to figure out how to protect themselves

6, They want to introduce new rules on auditing for Chinese companies listed int he US.

7, They both blame China for problems

8, They are trying to sell shares outside the US

9, The quality and standard of living have risen.

10, It is safer

11, It might trigger a military conflict